Is Egypt a Democracy Yet?

1. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) has lost legitimacy.

During the revolution, protesters often chanted, "The people and the army are one hand." But the SCAF is no longer seen as an appropriate caretaker of the democratic transition. During the recent November uprising, thousands of protestors congregated in Tahrir Square calling for the military to hand over the transition to civilians. The military and police used unnecessary and brutal force to break up the peaceful protests, leaving 40 people dead and over 2,000 injured. Prime Minister Isam Sharaf and the entire cabinet resigned on November 21 in protest of SCAF policies and tactics; the military's newly appointed prime minister was widely rejected by the public. Garnering unprecedented and widespread criticism, the SCAF has continually postponed the handover to civilian government, repressed and brutalized activists — through arbitrary arrests, torture, and military tribunals — and sought to secure its own power rather than transfer it to the people. The SCAF's control over the transition, particularly their insistence on controlling the constituent assembly that will write the new constitution, must change if this transition is to lead to real democracy.

2. Elections automatically favor established groups.

The Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi groups, and the Wafd party all have previous political experience, reliable networks, and well-organized infrastructure, giving them a distinct advantage over newer groups and political parties. The Freedom and Justice party, the party of the Muslim Brotherhood, is expected to reach a 40 percent majority (or higher), which they have announced they will use as leverage to push the SCAF for more civilian control. The Muslim Brotherhood has played astute politics. By not joining protestors in Tahrir Square to demand that the military step down and exploiting their electoral advantage with the same demands, they are aiming to take political leadership away from the protestors.

3. Revolutionary youth are trying to catch up.

After the revolution, progressive revolutionary leaders had to move fast to transform their momentum into participation in the parliamentary process. They didn't move fast enough. Inexperienced in formal political processes and with no existing political infrastructure, revolutionary youth diluted their impact by dispersing into six or seven new parties instead of consolidating their power into one or two. Many also called for a boycott of the elections in reaction to the continued repression in Tahrir by the SCAF and police. Recently, though, many of the revolutionary youth groups have consolidated their demand for an alternative government transition plan with Mohamed El Baradei leading Egypt through a civilian transition process. While the youth of the revolution are still at a disadvantage compared to established groups, they are turning a corner with their organizing strategy.

4. Elections dilute the impact of Tahrir demands.

The record numbers of citizens who voted prove that the desire to participate in government and have one's voice heard remains extremely strong in Egypt. But Tahrir protesters' demands need to be resolved in order for Egyptian democracy to flourish. Calling for the SCAF to step down, they are insisting on a civilian-led government transition and military accountability for the deaths and brutality since the revolution began. Protesters also want to end military tribunals for activists as well as the torture and mistreatment of detainees. All of these issues will not be resolved by the elections. As Cynthia P. Schneider and Khaled Abol Naga write, "The people dying on Egypt's streets are fighting for the true conditions of a just society. Elections . . . cannot be trusted to deliver that goal. Far from promoting democracy, holding the parliamentary elections on time ignores the will of the people . . . and plays into the hands of the [SCAF]."